Maine Law Review
Volume 59

Number 1

Article 8

January 2007

Lin v. United States Department of Justice: The Circuits Split On
the Issue of Whether Marital Status is Dispositive of Asylum
Eligibility in the United States for Individuals Who Suffer
Persecution under China's Coercive Family Planning Practices
Sara E. Stewart
University of Maine School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr
Part of the Immigration Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sara E. Stewart, Lin v. United States Department of Justice: The Circuits Split On the Issue of Whether
Marital Status is Dispositive of Asylum Eligibility in the United States for Individuals Who Suffer
Persecution under China's Coercive Family Planning Practices, 59 Me. L. Rev. 169 (2007).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol59/iss1/8

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of
Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.

LIN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE:
THE CIRCUITS SPLIT ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
MARITAL STATUS IS DISPOSITIVE OF ASYLUM
ELIGIBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES FOR
INDIVIDUALS WHO SUFFER PERSECUTION UNDER
CHINA'S COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING
PRACTICES
Sara E. Stewart
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION
POPULATION BOMB

A.
B.
III.

THE UNITED STATES RESPONDS TO CHINA'S COERCIVE PRACTICES

A.
B.
IV.

B.

In re C-Y-Z-: The BIA Interprets Section 601(a) of IIRIRA to Protect the
Spouse of a Victim
Circuit Split: Does Section 60J(a) of IIRIRA Apply to the Unmarried
Partner of a Victim?

THE LIN DECISION
ANALYSIS

A.
B.
VII.

Asylum Law and Policy
From "Careful Consideration" to the Amended Definition of Refugee
Under JIRIRA

INTERPRETATIONOF SECTION 601(A) OF IIRIRA

A.

V.
VI.

China's Coercive Population Control Policies
China's Enforcement Mechanism

Divergent Conclusions in Ma v. Ashcroft and Chen v. Ashcroft
How the BIA Should Decide Lin v. United States Department of Justice
on Remand from the Second Circuit

CONCLUSION

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 169 2007

MAINE LAW REVIEW

170

[Vol. 59:1

LIN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE:
THE CIRCUITS SPLIT ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
MARITAL STATUS IS DISPOSITIVE OF ASYLUM
ELIGIBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES FOR
INDIVIDUALS WHO SUFFER PERSECUTION UNDER
CHINA'S COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING
PRACTICES
Sara E. Stewart'
May 1993, when I was nineteen, I was found to be pregnant. We were both so happy,
and went to the government office to get legal paperwork for our marriage. We were
refused because I was under 20 . ... Feeling sick, I go to the hospital. The doctor
who examined me reported my apparent pregnancy to the government. As I had no
legal paper for marriage and no government-approved birth-allowed documents, my
baby was illegal and I could not have a baby . ... [T}hey took me to the hospital.
They locked me upfor hours in a small room in the hospital. They gave me a pill and
they were to come back in about thirty minutes with a shot. They forced me to
swallow the pill, but I escaped the shots. My boyfriend knew I was locked up. He
gave [one dollarJ to a nurse for her to open the window. She opened the window and
1jumped out. Then my boyfriend took me by a car straight to Guangzhou. 1
I. INTRODUCTION

In Lin v. United States Department of Justice, 2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit remanded three consolidated appeals to the Board oflmmigration Appeals (BIA) for reconsideration. 3 Petitioners Shi Liang Lin, Xian Zou, and
Zhen Hua Dong applied for asylum 4 based on persecution they and their unmarried
girlfriends suffered under the coercive family planning practices employed by the
People's Republic ofChina. 5

• J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Maine School of Law.
I. Forced Abortions and Sterilization in China: The View from the Inside: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on International Operations and Human Rights of the H. Comm. on International Relations,
105th Cong. 24-25 (1998) (statement of Zhou Shiu Yon, Coercive Population Control Victim).
2. Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2005).
3. Id at 192.
4. Once an individual is granted asylum status in the United States he or she is eligible to apply for
specific benefits, including an Employment Authorization Card (allowing him or her to work legally in the
United States), an unrestricted Social Security Card, cash and medical assistance, employment assistance,
and a refugee travel document with which he or she can travel, provided he or she does not return to the
country from which he or she fled as a refugee. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Frequently
Asked Questions About Asylum, http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/faq.htrn#dec3a (last visited
Sept. 24, 2006).
5. Lin, 416 F.3d at 188-89. See generally Erin Bergeson Huii Comment, When is the Unma"ied
Partner of an Alien Who Has Been Forcibly Subjected to Abortion or Sterilization a "Spouse" for the
Purpose of Asylum Eligibility? The Diverging Opinions of Ma v. Ashcroft and Chen v. Ashcroft, 2005
UTAHL.REV.1021, 1025-26 n.49 (2005) (citing China: Human Rights Violationand Coercion in One Child
Policy Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on International Relations, 108th Cong. (2004)
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Retaining jurisdiction over the petitions after re-disposition by the BIA, the
Second Circuit demanded that the BIA clarify two issues regarding its interpretation
of United States' immigration laws. First, the Second Circuit insisted on a precise
explanation of the rationale behind interpreting the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) section 60l(a) to include the "forced
sterilization of one spouse on account of a ground protected under the Act" as an "act
of persecution against the other spouse," resulting in the spouse's per se asylum
eligibility. 6 Secondly, the court asked the BIA to clarify ''whether, when, and why
boyfriends and fiances may or may not similarly qualify as refugees pursuant to
IIRIRA § 601(a)." 7 As ofMarch 29, 2006, the BIA has not yet considered the appeals
on remand.
Although analyzed disparately by Immigration Judges (Us), the BIA, and the
United States Courts of Appeals,8 the question that lingers is whether refugee status,
and the concomitant eligibility for asylum in the United States, should be extended to
individuals who are persecuted pursuant to China's coercive family planning practices
because their unmarried partners are forced to undergo an unwanted abortion or
sterilization procedure.
This Note begins with a briefoutline of the history of China's coercive population
control and the United States' expression ofopposition to China's policies through the
enactment and amendment of immigration law. Section IV discusses the BIA's
ambiguous holding in In re C-Y-Z-, in which it first extended asylum status to the
spouse of an individual directly persecuted under China's coercive population control.
Next, it reviews two recent cases with disparate outcomes decided by the Third and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding whether such protection should be extended
to the unmarried partner of a person similarly persecuted.

(statement of John S. Aird, former Research Specialist on China, U.S. Bureau of Census), available at
http://www.intemationalrelations.house.gov/archives/l08/97363.pdf).
Aird, who filed more than 350
affidavits on behalf of Chinese women who sought asylum based on forced sterilization or abortion,
recounted compulsory sterilizations of Chinese women and men, the abortion and attempted abortion offullterm fetuses, and myriad appalling methods of averting and eradicating unauthorized pregnancies and births.
Id.
6. Lin, 416 F.3d at 187 (quoting In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915,919 (BJ.A. 1997)).
1. Id. at 192. As of February 20, 2006, the BIA has not had the opportunity to analyze these petitions
on remand.
8. See, e.g., Yuan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 2005) (expressing doubt as to
the BIA's reasoning in C-Y-Z-); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 561 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that "spouse"
may be interpreted to include those individuals who were married in a traditional Chinese ceremony and
would be legally married in China but for China's coercive family planning policies); In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I.
& N. Dec. at 919 (holding that IIRIRA section 601(a) demands that the spouses of those directly victimized
by coercive family planning policies are per seas eligible for asylum as those directly victimized). But see
Chen v. Gonzales, 152 Fed. App'x. 528,530 (7th Cir. 2005) (affrrming, without comment, the decision not
to extend presumption of persecution to unmarried individuals); Zhang v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531, 532 (5th
Cir. 2004) (agreeing with the Third Circuit's decision in Chen v. Ashcroft not to extend the presumption of
persecution to unmarried individuals); Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 227-29 (3d Cir. 2004) (determining
that the presumption of persecution extends to spouses of women forced to undergo abortions but not to
unmarried men). In a recent decision that never reached the issue of unmarrieds' asylum eligibility, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit characterized the case law as a "circuit split." Chen v.
Gonzales, 418 F.3d 110, 111 (1st Cir. 2005).
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In conclusion, this Note argues for the extension of refugee status and asylum
eligibility to unmarried partners under section 60l(a) ofIIRIRA, based, in part, on the
reasoning put forth in the concurrence to C-Y-Z-. Although practicality and efficiency
of process may be served by a bright-line rule restricting derivative asylum status to
legally recognized spouses, such a limitation produces absurd and unjust results. As
a result of China's coercive family planning practices, couples who are denied access
to a legally recognized marriage, and who fear a traditional marriage will alert Chinese
authorities of their unlawful cohabitation, are faced with a dismal decision: either
remain in China and suffer continued threat and persecution, or flee to the United
States and encounter a judicial system whose interpretation of immigration laws will
result in the denial of asylum based on a marital status that is the consequence of
coercive family planning laws.

II.

POPULATION BOMB

A. China's Coercive Population Control Policies

In 1949, the year the People's Republic was founded, China's population totaled
541.67 million. 9 Convinced a large population was essential for productivity and
socialist composition, the Maoist leadership ignored ample warning about the perils
of overpopulation from China's foremost economists, and promoted population growth
throughout the l 950s. ' 0 Increased fertility rates, coupled with declining mortality and
the government's endorsement of population growth, resulted in the doubling of
China's population in just over thirty-five years. 11 It was not until the late 1950s and
early 1960s that China implemented its first population control policies. They were
short-lived, however, and were thwarted by the turbulence accompanying the start of
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Although dormant for nearly a decade, the
Chinese government's concerns about overpopulation did not disappear.
Acute political unrest subsided in the 1970s and, shortly thereafter, the first formal
family planning policy was announced. It took the form of a propaganda campaign
called "wan, xi, shao" or "later, longer, fewer," and contemplated later marriages,
longer time lapses between births, and fewer births. 12 Then, in 1979, the "one couple,
one child" policy was adopted, limiting parents to one child. 13 The following year, the
Marriage Law took effect 14 under which men were not permitted to marry legally until

9. Gerrie Zhang, Comment, U.S. Asylum Policy and Population Control in the People's Republic of
China, 18 Haus. J. INT'LL. 557,560 (1996);see also Hull, supra note 5, at 1022.
10. In 1974, a spokesman for the Chinese government claimed that a rapid increase in population was
"a very good thing" and the theories on population explosions were "fallac[ies] peddled by the
superpowers." Zhang, supra note 9, at 561.
11. Id at 560.
12. Id at 561.
13. Couples were limited to one child with exceptions permitted in a limited number of cases. In 1984,
the one-child policy was modified specifically to allow ethnic minorities to have more than one child, and
in some rural areas, parents are permitted to have more than one child. In 1988, couples in rural provinces
were eligible to have more than one child, after a period of time, if their first child was a girl. Id at 561-62.
14. Hull, supra note 5, at 1023 (citing Tara A. Gellman, Note, The Blurred Line Between Aiding
Progress and Sanctioning Abuse: United States Appropriations, the UNFPA, and Family Planning in the
P.R.C., 17N.Y.L.SCH.J.HUM.RTS. 1063, 1065(2001)).
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the age of twenty-two and women not until the age oftwenty.1 5 Under China's 1982
Constitution, 16 the government sets the target population 17 and endorses a family
planning policy, thereby encouraging "delayed marriage and postponement of having
children, giving birth to fewer but healthier children, and one family, one child .... " 18
Notwithstanding China's stringent policies, its population continues to grow at the
rate of sixteen million per year. 19 Meanwhile, China supports one-fifth of the total
world population on less than eight percent of the world's arable land. 20 The Chinese
government contends that, if it is not regulated, "rapid population growth could
threaten the subsistence of the Chinese nation, leading to a catastrophe and an exodus
ofrefugees." 21 As reasonable as China's population concerns may be, policies that
subject Chinese citizens to human rights violations, creating thousands of victims
annually, 22 cannot be justified. 23

15. Id.
16. See XIANFA art. 25 ( 1982) (P .R.C.) ("The state promotes family planning so that population growth
may fit the plans for economic and social development .... ").
17. China "hopes to reach its maximum desired population size of 1.6 billion no sooner than 2050."
Hull, supra note 5, at 1022.
18. Zhang, supra note 9, at 562.
19. China to Continue Its Population Control Policy, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 5, 2005,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-01/05/content_ 2421042.htm.
20. Hull, supra note 5, at I 022.
21. Zhang, supra note 9, at 566.
22. Testifying before the United States House of Representatives' Committee on International Relations,
Harry Wu, executive director of the Laogai Research Foundation, stated that despite the recent attempts at
reform, China's population control policy fails to conform to UN principles. In a prepared statement, Wu
declared that:
The one-child policy is the most pervasive source of human rights violations in China today.
It affects every family, every woman .... A majority of Chinese women are required to use
intrauterine devices (IUDs). Violators, if discovered to be pregnant, are coerced into having
an abortion. Most violators of the one-child policy are forced to undergo sterilization.
Doctors who do not perform IUD insertion or sterilization, or who fake these operations, are
jailed. Family members of violators are often jailed if they do not reveal the violator's
whereabouts. Despite relaxation of certain aspects of China's family planning regulations,
enforcement of the one-child policy continues to be coercive.
China: Human Rights Violations and Coercion in One-Child Policy Enforcement: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on International Relations, 108th Cong. 35 (2004) (prepared statement of Harry Wu, Executive
Director, Laogai Research Foundation), available at http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/
Wu statement]; see also id. at 51 (prepared statement of John S. Aird,
archives/108/97363.pdf[hereinafter
Former Senior Research Specialist on China, U.S. Census Bureau) [hereinafter Aird statement]. Aird stated
that in the last four or five years "foreign journalists in China have cited instances of violent family planning
measures more extreme than any reported previously in the one-child policy's 25 year history." Id.
23. Leaders of the communist government in China, such as Jiang Zemin, have attempted to justify
China's coercive policies by touting its positive impact on economic well-being and stability. Wu statement,
supra note 22, at 36. The same leaders have relied on the ratio of China's massive population to the small
amount of land capable of supporting agricultural activities, arguing that harsh measures are necessary to
restrict population and guarantee there is sufficient food for everyone to eat. Id. However, these arguments
are groundless; "[w]hat China needs most in order to thrive is a free political and social system." Id. Wu
argues that by analogizing to the situations in Japan and Taiwan China's argument can be refuted. Id. With
a "population of more than 1.3 billion, 22% of the world and only just over 9% of arable land of the world,
Japan and Taiwan enjoy[] relatively prosperous economic conditions and stability." Id. In contrast to
China, "Japan and Taiwan [have] free and open political and social system[s] that drive[] [their] success."
Id.
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B. China's Enforcement Mechanism
There is ample evidence that the Chinese government knowingly continues to
employ coercive tactics in order to achieve lower birth rates, especially in rural
provinces. 24 To guarantee compliance with China's one-child plan, family planning
officials use insidious techniques, ranging from political pressure and public
degradation to invasive medical procedures. 25 A volunteer network consisting of
thirteen million cadres oversees the distribution and use of contraceptives and regulates
unlawful pregnancies in their communities. 26 In some provinces, every woman's
menstrual cycle and choice of contraceptive is publicly tracked and women who avoid
the policy are publicly humiliated. 27
Among the most severe practices relied on by officials are forced late-term
abortions, obligatory sterilization, and non-consensual insertion of intrauterine
devices. 28 Recently, however, more extreme measures have been reported. 29 Although

24. Chinese leadership has consistently "signaled" to their subordinates that coercive strategies were
expected. Aird statement, supra note 22, at 54. As early as the 1980s Deng Xiaoping clarified this position.
Id. In 1981, Chen Muhua, the head of family planning, purportedly quoted Deng as stating, "In order to
reduce the population, use whatever means you must, but do it!" Id. Hoping to calm the fears of local
family planning officials, and worried that they would be accused of utilizing coercion, Chen said, "With
the support of the Party Central Committee, you should have nothing to fear." Id. In 1983, Premier Zhao
Ziyang told local family planning officials to "prevent additional births by all means." Id. Moreover, there
is abundant evidence that coercive policies continue today. As late as March 11, 2001, Jiang Zemin
pronounced that population control was a "major affair for strengthening the country, enriching the people,
and maintaining tranquility .... " Id. at 55. Its successful continuance required "really effective measures"
and necessitated that the government "grasp ever more tightly and still do better with this major item of
economic and social work without the slightest slackness or relaxation." Id. Aird argues, "When the central
authorities issue injunctions such as these and do not include warnings to avoid coercion, the lower levels
know what is expected of them!" Id.
25. Hull, supra note 5, at 1025; see also Kimberly Sicard, Note, Section 601 of/IR/RA: A Long Road
lo a Resolution of United Stales Asylum Policy Regarding Coercive Methods of Population Control, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 927, 930 (2000).
26. Sicard, supra note 25, at 930. It should be noted that local family planning cadres and officials are
also victims of governmental coercion. Through a system referred to as "veto with one vote," those cadres
and officials who fail to meet family planning goals were to be deemed an utter failure in their annual
evaluations, irrespective of their achievements in other areas of responsibility and are punished accordingly.
Aird statement, supra note 22, at 59. Literally, a "failure in family planning 'vetoed' all other
achievements." Id.
27. Hull, supra note 5, at 1025.
28. Id. at I 025-26.
29. In February of 2001, Amnesty International reported an incident in Changsha, Hunan Province that
occurred in May 1998, involving a man named Zhou whose wife left for Guangdong Province to seek work.
Aird statement, supra note 22, at 56. Family planning officials in Changsha suspected that she was pregnant
without permission and, in an attempt to force him to disclose her location, captured and tortured her
husband twice. Id. The second time, he was "denied food, hung upside down, whipped and beaten with
wooden clubs and burned with cigarette butts." Id. He became "doubly incontinent, his body covered with
excrement. The officials reportedly then branded his lower body with soldering irons, tied a wire around
his genitals, and ripped off his penis. Zhou died on 15 May 1998." Id. In August of 2000, in Caidian
Township, Hubei Province, cadres kidnapped a newborn baby boy from the arms of a retired doctor as she
was taking him home to care for him. Id. In a nearby flooded paddy field, within site of the doctor and
neighbors, they drowned the baby in shallow water. Id.
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incidents of death in connection with family planning practices are rare, the few stories
that make the headlines "probably represent many more incidents, no word of which
has reached the international media." 30 The Chinese government shields these
atrocities from Chinese journalists, insists that they are fabricated, and forces
journalists and victims to publicly admit to lying.31
In addition to coercive measures, the Chinese government exploits "non-coercive"
techniques, including "economic and social incentives and disincentives, propaganda
and education." 32 Couples who promise to comply with the one-child policy receive
monthly stipends and preferred access to medical treatment and education. 33 Moreover, the government offers benefits such as "larger living quarters, better child care,
and longer maternity leave .... " 34 On the contrary, noncompliance results in penalties
that "range from fines, job demotions, and withholding of social services, to loss of
employment, imprisonment, and confiscation or destruction ofproperty." 3 s
III. THE UNITED STATES RESPONDS TO CHINA'S COERCIVE PRACTICES
A. Asylum Law and Policy
In order to establish eligibility for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), an individual must prove that she is a refugee within the meaning of the
statute. 36 The INA defines refugee as one who is ''unable or unwilling to avail himself
or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." 37 Although the applicant bears the burden of
proving that she meets the statutory definition of refugee, the Attorney General
nonetheless retains ultimate discretion to grant or deny any application. 38
Although an affirmative finding of refugee status will not necessarily result in a
conferral of asylum, 39 such a conclusion forbids deportation of the applicant to a
country where her life or liberty is threatened on account of her race, religion, nation-

30. Id. at 57.
3 I. Id. at 58.
32. Hui~ supra note 5, at 1025.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184,187 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing 8 U.S.C. § I I0l(a)(42)
(1994)). The Immigration and Nationality Act can be foundat8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000 & Supp. I 2001
& Supp. II 2002).
37. 8 U.S.C. § I I0l(a)(42) (1994). After the Supreme Court's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca, the BIA
has held that an asylum applicant must establish that "a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear
persecution [and] that his fear of persecution is both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable."
Zhang, supra note 9, at 576 (quoting In re R-0-, Int. Dec. 3170 at 5 (BJ.A. 1992) (citations omitted)); see
also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (holding that Congress used different, broader language
to define the term refugee, as used in § 208(a), than it used to describe the class of aliens who had a right
to withholding of deportation under§ 243(h), and thus, the U and the BIA erred in applying the "more likely
than not" objective standard of proof from § 243(h) to respondent's § 208(a) asylum claim and should have
instead applied the more generous, subjective "well founded fear" standard).
38. Lin, 416 F.3d at 187.
39. Id.
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ality, membership in a specific social grotip, or political opinion. 40 To establish eligibility for withholding of deportation, a non-citizen must demonstrate that she faces the
"clear probability of persecution," a standard more stringent than that required to
establish asylum. 41 Thus, if an applicant fails to obtain asylum, she will necessarily
not be eligible for withholding of deportation.
Where an applicant establishes eligibility based on past persecution, she creates
the presumption ofa ''well-founded fear ofpersecution." 42 Such a presumption may
be rebutted, however, based on a preponderance of the evidence demonstrating that a
"fundamental change in circumstances" has occurred "such that the applicant no longer
has a well-founded fear of persecution,'"' 3 which often results in the denial of an
asylum application.

B. From "Careful Consideration" to the Amended Definition of
Refugee Under 1/RIRA
Since China initiated its coercive population control practices, the United States
has expressed opposition to China's coercive family planning policies. However, it
was not until 1998 that the United States government made the first administrative
pronouncement requiring all asylum adjudicators to give "careful consideration" to
applications filed by Chinese nationals who articulated a fear of persecution because
of their refusal to undergo a sterilization procedure or to abort a pregnancy in
resistance to China's population control policies. 44 Nine years earlier, in In re Chang,
the BIA refused to extend refugee status to a Chinese national who fled China after the
birth of his second child because Chinese officials threatened to sterilize him. 45

40. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(I) (1994). This section provides: "The Attorney General shall not deport or
return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would
be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion." Id.
41. See INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407,424 (1984).
42. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(I) (2006).
43. Id.§ 1208.13(b)(l)(i)(A). Previously, the regulation required proof of changed country conditions
in lieu of the current requirement of a "fundamental change in circumstances." Hull, supra note 5, at I 028
n.66 (quoting In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915,919 (B.I.A. 1997)). In 2001, the language was altered so
that "other changes in circumstances surrounding the asylum claim, including a fundamental change in
personal circumstances, may be considered, so long as those changes are fundamental in nature and go to
the basis of the fear of persecution." The low preponderance of the evidence standard, coupled with the
broadened conception of"fundamental circumstances," arguably makes it less difficult for the government
to rebut an asylum applicant's "well founded fear of persecution." Id (quoting In re Y-T-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec.
601, 604-05 (B.I.A. 2003)).
44. Zhang, supra note 9, at 578. This directive for enhanced consideration came in the form of a
memorandum drafted by then-Attorney General Edwin Meese ID. The memorandum mandated that if the
refusal to submit to China's intrusive procedures was "an act of conscience with full awareness" of the
importance the Chinese government placed on its family planning policies and with a knowledge of the
likely consequences of such a defiance, it would be appropriate to interpret such non-cooperation "as an act
of political defiance sufficient to establish refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § I JOl(a)(42)(A)." Id. (quoting
Memorandum from Edwin Meese ID, Attorney General to Alan C. Nelson, Commissioner, Immigration &
Naturalization Service (Aug. 5, 1988)). Thus, a finding of well-founded fear would be reasonable under
those circumstances.
45. In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 47 (B.1.A. 1989). The BIA determined that policy guidelines
contained in administrative pronouncements were directed at the INS, and thus, did not apply to decisions
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Congress responded to the BIA's decision with an attempt to pass the Emergency
Chinese Immigration Relief Act. 46
Despite overwhelming support for the Bill in both Houses, 47 then-President
George H. W. Bush vetoed it, announcing that he would provide the same immigration
benefits administratively that the bill offered, while maintaining the ability to manage
foreign relations. 48 Concurrent to his pronouncement, President Bush directed the
Secretary of State and the Attorney General to provide "enhanced consideration ...
for individuals from any country who express a fear of persecution upon return to their
49
country related to that country's policy of forced abortion or coerced sterilization."
By Executive Order in April of 1990, President Bush "reaffirmed his original
directive" requiring "enhanced consideration." 50
Thereafter, Attorney General Thornburgh amended the INA and promulgated an
interim rule providing that asylum applicants ''who have a well-founded fear that they
will be required to abort a pregnancy or to be sterilized ... may be granted asylum on
the ground of persecution on account of political opinion. " 51 The amended regulations
allowed the applicant or her spouse to be granted asylum if either of them refused to
abort a pregnancy or undergo a sterilization procedure in violation of their country's
family planning policy. 52 Inexplicably, in the asylum regulations, published in July of
1990, the INS omitted the interim rule, reinstating In re Chang. 53
54
Inconsistency in immigration policy resulted in irreconcilable adjudication. In
1994, after a protracted inter-agency review of conflicting policy, the Clinton administration declared that the INS was permitted in certain cases to provide "discretionary
humanitarian relief' outside of the context of asylum. 55 But this policy was criticized
for its ambiguity; there was no indication of how long the policy was to remain in
56
effect or whether asylum relief extended to the applicants' family members.

made by immigration judges and the BIA. Id. at 43. In re Chang was designated a precedent decision and
therefore was binding on immigration judges and the INS. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.l(g) (1995).
46. Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, S. 1370, 101st. Cong. (1989).
4 7. The House of Representatives passed the bill by a vote of 403-0, and the Senate passed it by voice
vote. President Vetoes Chinese Student Bill, Offers Administrative Relief Instead, 66 INTERPRETER
RELEASES1313, 1314 (1989).
48. Zhang, supra note 9, at 581 (citing Memorandum of Disapproval for the Emergency Chinese
Immigration Relief Act of 1989, 25 WKLY.COMP.PRES.Doc. 1853, 1853-54 (1989)).
49. Id. (quoting Memorandum of Disapproval for the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of
1989, 25 WKLY.COMP.PRES.Doc. 1853, 1853 (1989)).
50. Id. at 582 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,711, 3 C.F.R. 283 (I 991)).
51. Id (quoting 55 Fed. Reg. 2803 (Jan. 29, 1990)).
52. 55 Fed. Reg. 2803, 2805 (Jan. 29, 1990).
53. Zhang, supra note 9, at 582-83; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
54. See generally Zhang, supra note 9, at 582-88.
55. Id. at 590. Discretionary measures were only exercised where the applicant displayed a "credible
fear" of returning to China based on an imminent danger of forced abortion or sterilization, the threat of
severe harm for refusal to submit to abortion or sterilization, or the risk of grave harm for violating other
family planning practices. Id at 591. The relief offered was a stay of deportation for an unspecified amount
oftime. Id.
56. Id at 592. One critic, an immigration policy consultant, proffered that President Clinton's directive
would result in "a profusion of asylum policies among the 36 INS districts" because INS district directors
would be "free to expand individual interpretation in granting stays of deportation .... " James H. Walsh,
Passing the Buck on Immigration, WASH.POST,Aug. 20, 1994, at Al 8.
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Finally, in 1996, Congress passed IIRIRA, 57 mandating that the BIA recognize
"persecution" where an individual has suffered under China's coercive population
control policies. 58 Congress achieved this recognition by expanding the INA's
definition of"refugee." 59 Before IIRIRA's passage, Congress held a series ofhearings
on the issue of coercive population control in China. One of the main sponsors of the
amendment, Congressman Christopher Smith, noted that forced abortion and
sterilization were "among the most gruesome human rights violations." 60 Since
IIRIRA's enactment, the BIA and the courts have consistently extended the statute's
protections to the husbands of women forced to undergo abortion and/or sterilization
procedures. 61 Arguably, by providing relief for partners persecuted as a result of an
"unlawful" pregnancy and by keeping families together, these decisions further
congressional intent. 62
Simultaneous to enacting IIRIRA, Congress implemented a one-thousand-perfiscal-year cap on the number of Chinese citizens eligible for asylum under IIRIRA. 63

57. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
58. See Michelle Chen, Leaving One Child Behind: Chinese Immigrants Seek Asylum in America from
China's One-Child Policy, 2005-DEC LEGAL A.FF.8, 9 (2005).
59. Section 60l(a) ofIIRIRA amended the original definition of refugee under section JOl(a)(42) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act. The following sentence was added:
For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who has been forced to abort a
pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or
refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control
program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a
person who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure
or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 601(a)(I),
I JO Stat. 3009-546, 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § I IOl(a)(42) (2000)). Interestingly, the
1996 amendment was motivated in part by the controversy in the United States regarding abortion rights.
Chen, supra note 58, at 9. Condemning China's family planning policy as a widespread human rights abuse,
anti-abortion groups lobbied Congress to oppose coercive family planning. Id
60. Coercive Population Control in China: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Operations
& Human Rights of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Rep.
Christopher Smith).
61. See, e.g., Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that where China's marriage
laws prevent a legal marriage, a traditional marriage should be recognized for the purposes of establishing
asylum status based on the forced abortion of the petitioner's de facto wife); He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593,
603-04 (9th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that where the petitioner's wife underwent a sterilization procedure, the
petitioner was automatically eligible for asylum); Qui v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2003)
(acknowledging that where a petitioner's wife undergoes either a forced abortion or sterilization, he is
eligible for asylum). In these cases, neither the INS nor the BIA called into question the petitioners' lack
of a legally recognized marriage certificate, nor did the lack of a Chinese marriage certificate result in the
denial of their asylum applications. Ma, 361 F.3d at 559 n.8.
62. See Ma, 361 F.3dat 559 (citingH.R. Rep. No. 104-469(1), at 174 (1996)). But see Chen v. Ashcroft,
381 F.3d 221,222 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the BIA's decision that asylum based on China's coercive
family planning policies can only be granted to "spouses," which contributes to "efficient administration"
while avoiding "difficult and problematic factual inquiries, is reasonable" even though it may produce
"undesirable results" in certain cases).
63. Chen, 381 F.3d at 225. The statute provides, "For any fiscal year, not more than a total of 1,000
refugees may be ... granted asylum ... pursuant to a determination under the third sentence of section

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 178 2007

2007]

MARITAL STATUS & ASYLUM ELIGIBILITY

179

64
the cap was repealed in 2005.
Pursuant to section lOl(g) of the REAL ID Act,
Currently, the issue of whether asylum relief will be extended to unmarried partners
of victims of China's family planning policy has erupted into what the First Circuit
65
describes as "an active circuit split."

IV. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 60l(A) OF IIRIRA

A. In re C-Y-Z-: The BIA Interprets Section 601 (a) of IIRIRA to
Protect the Spouse of a Victim
In 1997, the BIA had its first opportunity to apply the amended definition of
refugee, determining that the statutory amendment extended asylum eligibility to an
spouse was forced to undergo a sterilization
applicant whose "legally recognized"
procedure. 66 In C-Y-Z-, the applicant fled China and, upon arriving in the United
67
States, applied for asylum based on his wife's forced sterilization procedure.
and the INS's stance that
Relying on the enactment of section 60l(a) ofIIRIRA
past persecution of one spouse can be proved by forced abortion or sterilization of the
69
Granting
other spouse, 68 the BIA overruled the Immigration Judge's (IJ's) decision.
request for asylum, the BIA held that a non-citizen whose spouse was
the applicant's
compelled to undergo an abortion or sterilization may establish past persecution as a

I0I(a)(42) (relating to persecution for resistance to coercive population control methods)." Id. at n.2
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § I 157(a)(5) (2000)). As of September 2003, the total list of eligible individuals awaiting
a grant of asylum was over seven thousand. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, EOIR Notifies
Persons Eligible for Full Asylum Benefits for Fiscal Year 2003 Based on Coercive Population Control
Policies (Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/03/CPCAsylumRelease0903.pdf.
Thus, applicants who are afforded conditional asylum must wait at least seven years before full asylum
benefits, including applying for lawful permanent residence status and the ability to petition for the admission into the United States of family members not contemplated by the original asylum application. Id.
64. Pub. L. No. 109-13, § I0l(g), 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (repealing the IIRIRA provision that originally
implemented the cap).
65. Chen v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 110, 111 (1st Cir. 2005).
66. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915,918 (B.1.A. 1997).
67. Id. at 915-16. The sterilization procedure was imposed as punishment for their violation of China's
one-child policy. Id.
68. Id. at 918. In a memorandum issued on October 21, 1996, the INS expressly stated that "an
applicant whose spouse was forced to undergo an abortion or involuntary sterilization has suffered past
persecution, and may thereby be eligible for asylum under the terms of the new refugee definition." Id.
(quoting Memorandum from the Office of the Gen. Counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization Svc. on
Asylum Based on Coercive Family Planning Policies-§ 601 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 4 (Oct. 21, 1996)). Moreover, in its brief, the INS conceded that "the
husband of a sterilized wife can essentially stand in her shoes and make a bona fide and non-frivolous
application for asylum based on problems impacting more intimately on her than on him." Id.
69. Id. at 919. The U reasoned that it seemed that the Chinese government merely "put some roadblocks
in this applicant and his wife's way in having their family." Id. at 916. Although he recognized the wife's
forced sterilization procedure, he noted that the applicant did not have many other issues in China and that
his wife "did not gain anything from having the applicant abandon her and the children for the United
States." Id. Finally, the U held that the applicant "himself, has never been persecuted and he cannot show
either past persecution or a reasonable fear of future persecution." Id. In the U's defense, his decision was
rendered prior to the enactment of section 60l(a) ofIIRIRA. Id. at 915.
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result of his political opinion in opposition to China's family planning policy, thereby
qualifying as a refugee within the amended definition. 70
B. Circuit Split: Does Section 60J(a) of JJRJRAApply to the Unmarried
Partner of a Victim?
Based on the BIA's reasoning in C-Y-Z-, unmarried applicants have attempted to
establish past persecution and asylum status in the United States by virtue of an
unmarried partner's forced abortion or sterilization at the hands of the Chinese government. Arguing to extend the reasoning in C-Y-Z- has been especially persuasive where
a couple is precluded from registering their marriage as a result of China's severe
marriage laws. Although arguably distinguishable on the facts,71 two decisions by the
Ninth and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals analyzed the issue to conflicting ends.
In Ma v. Ashcroft, 72 the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision to overrule the
IJ's determination to grant Ma asylum based on the forced abortion of his de facto
''wife." 73 After considering the applicability of section 601(a) to the de facto
"husband" 74 of a Chinese woman whose pregnancy was forcefully aborted during the
third trimester, the Ninth Circuit held that "husbands whose marriages would be
legally recognized, but for China's coercive family planning policies," were entitled
to asylum as a result of their wives' forced sterilization or abortion. 75 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that China's prohibition of underage marriage "is inextricably linked"
to its coercive family planning policies and specifically aimed at reducing the period

70. Id at 9 I 9-20.
71. See Hull, supra note 5, at 1038 (citing two major factual distinctions between the two cases). First,
Ma was married to his wife in a traditional ceremony in their village, whereas Chen never formalized his
relationship with his girlfriend. Second, during his lengthy detention in Guam as an "illegal immigrant,"
Ma turned twenty-two, registered his marriage with the Chinese government, and received a marriage
certificate. Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 556-57 (9th Cir. 2004). Unlike Ma, Chen never registered his
marriage with the Chinese government. Hull, supra note 5, at 1038-39. In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Ma, the Third Circuit refused to recognize that its decision in Chen created a circuit split on the
issue of eligibility of unmarried partners. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 23 I (3d. Cir. 2005).
72. 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Zheng v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 993, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that China's coercive birth control program would render Zheng eligible for asylum based on his
wife's forced abortion despite the fact that they were not legally married).
73. Ma, 361 F.3d at 559. The U assigned to Ma's application concluded that refugee status was "not
limited to individuals who actually undergo a[n] involuntary abortion or sterilization but appears to
encompass those who would offer resistance to coercive population control programs." Id at 556. The U
reasoned as follows:
In a situation where a marriage cannot be registered because foreign law precludes marriage
by men under the age of [twenty-two], while no visa petition for example, could be granted
on a spouse ... petition, there does not appear to be a logical or statutory basis to rule that
a common law husband cannot meet his burden of proof when his common law wife has had
a forced abortion.
Id.
74. Because Ma was prohibited from marrying his girlfriend, Chiu, as a result of China's marriage laws,
Ma and Chiu were married in a traditional Chinese ceremony. Id. at 555. However, during his lengthy
detention in the United States, Ma turned twenty-two and legally registered his marriage with the Chinese
government. Id. at 557. He presented this certificate recognizing his de facto marriage to the BIA on appeal
from the !J's grant of his asylum application. Id.
75. Id. at 561.
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of time during which Chinese couples can legally reproduce. 76 Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit recognized that in the case of C-Y-Z-, where the male petitioner entered into
a marriage deemed illegal by the Chinese government because the woman was underage, the BIA did not deny relief on the ground that the petitioner failed to produce a
marriage "registration" certificate from the Chinese government, nor did the BIA refer
to the lack of marriage registration as an issue to be considered in reviewing asylum
petitions. 77
The Ninth Circuit found that denying asylum to applicants who are not permitted
to marry because of China's intrusive family planning policies would subvert
Congress's intent "to provide relief for 'couples' persecuted on account of an
'unauthorized' pregnancy and to keep families together." 78 Holding otherwise, the
court reasoned, would create "absurd" results, whereby a woman would be eligible for
asylum but her husband would not, forcing the separation of a de facto husband and
wife. 79 Interpreting section 601(a) in this manner is "at odds not only with the
provision at issue here, but also with significant parts of our overall immigration
policy." 80 The Ninth Circuit asserted that it is "absurd and wholly unacceptable" to
deny asylum to a person based solely on the consequence of a population control
policy expressly "deemed by Congress to be oppressive and persecutory;" 81 it goes
against the purpose and policies of the statutory amendment outlined in IIRIRA.
About five months after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ma v. Ashcroft, the Third
Circuit decided Chen v. Ashcroft. 82 Similar to Ma, Chen was not permitted to marry
his live-in girlfriend, Chen Gui, because of China's inflated minimum age marriage
requirement. 83 When Chen Gui became pregnant, local family planning officials were
alerted. 84 Although she went into hiding, Chen Gui was eventually captured and
forced to undergo an abortion in the eighth month of her pregnancy. 85 Shortly
thereafter, Chen left China for the United States and applied for asylum. 86 Analogizing
to C-Y-Z-, the IJ granted relief and the BIA reversed, holding that the reasoning in "CY-Z- had 'not been extended to unmarried partners .... "' 87 Chen appealed the BIA's
decision to the Third Circuit. 88
Then Third Circuit Judge, now Justice Samuel Alito rejected Chen's argument that
the BIA's interpretation of section 601(a) was "arbitrary and capricious" under the

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 560.
Id. at 559 n.8.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id. at 559.
See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Chevron doctrine. 89 Although the BIA' s decision to use marital status as the dispositive
factor in an asylum petition is over-and-under-inclusive, Judge Alito found that the
BIA could have logically concluded that "aliens who are married are more likely than
aliens not so situated to be severely injured ... when their partners are forced to
endure forced abortions or sterilization." 90 From an administrative perspective, with
efficacy of procedure as the goal, the existence of a marriage can be easily proven
through "objective documentary evidence." 91 Moreover, without such a requirement,
applicants would be encouraged to falsify an intimate relationship in order to increase
their chances of securing asylum in the United States. 92 A bright-line rule prevents
intractable factual inquiries into the private lives of asylum applicants.
Finally, Judge Alito found the mere fact that Chen was denied access to marriage
because of China's family planning laws was inconsequential. 93 Unlike the Ninth
Circuit, the Third Circuit found no evidence that the BIA's bright-line rule requiring
a legally recognized marriage subverted congressional intent. 94 Analyzing section
60l(a), the court held that because "persecution" was left "completely undefined,"
Congress intended to leave the interpretational authority in the hands of the BIA,
"including the ability to decide, within a reasonable range, the precise contours of[the
term's] meaning." 95 Additionally, the court found the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ma
v. Ashcroft inconsistent with the I 000-person-per-year statutory cap because Congress
could not have "intended to dramatically broaden the notion of 'persecution' with
respect to persons suffering under coercive population [control] programs .... " 96
Thus, the Third Circuit held that, "assuming ... C-Y-Z- permissibly applied the 1996
amendment to spouses, ... the BIA's decision not to extend C-Y-Z- to unmarried
partners is reasonable" and worthy of Chevron deference. 97
Upon this cracked foundation, the Second Circuit decided Lin v. United States
Department of Justice. 98
V. THE

LIN DECISION

In Lin v. United States Department of Justice, three Chinese citizens sought
judicial review of the BIA's decisions to affirm the IJ's denial of each of their asylum
applications. According to their petitions, Lin and Zou suffered persecution when their

89. Under principles set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc., the
BIA's interpretation of section 60l(a) to exclude from eligibility for asylum the unmarried partners of
individuals who were forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization was entitled to deference unless it was
"arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 223-24 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
90. Id. at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 229.
93. See id. at 229-3 I.
94. Id. at 231-32.
95. Id. at 232 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)); see also
Hull, supra note 5, at 1037.
96. Chen, 381 F.3d at 233.
97. Id. at 235.
98. 416 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2005).
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girlfriends, whom they were not permitted to marry, 99 were kidnapped by Chinese
family planning officials, taken to local hospitals, and forced to undergo late-term
abortions. 100 The devastating events and attendant fear of subsequent persecution
drove Lin and Zou to seek refuge in the United States. Upon their arrival, they
promptly applied for asylum.
Similarly, Dong endured persecution at the hands of the Chinese government
when his fiance' 0 ' discovered she was pregnant during a routine gynecological exam
in August of 1998. What started out as a routine physical exam morphed into a
nightmare when family planning officials forcefully aborted her baby 102 on that same
day and warned Dong that he would face fines and sterilization if she ever were to
become pregnant again. Notwithstanding the threat, Dong's fiance became pregnant
in May of 1999. Fearing for the life of her baby and her fiance, she fled their village,
but ultimately was captured and forced to undergo an abortion late in her third
trimester. 103 Depressed and afraid, Dong escaped China and applied for asylum in the
United States, hoping to secure asylum for his fiance as well.
The essential issue presented to the Second Circuit on appeal was whether section
601(a) ofIIRIRA could be interpreted to extend asylum eligibility to the unmarried
partner of an individual forced to undergo an abortion and/or sterilization procedure. 104
The IJ responsible for considering Lin's asylum application denied asylum, refusing
to extend the reasoning in C-Y-Z- because Lin was not married to the victim who
suffered persecution directly. The IJ stated, "it would not be appropriate to expand ...
Matter of C-Y-Z-, to include unmarried couples." 105 Such an expansion "would be
inappropriate because, inter alia, Congress had imposed a 1,000 person-per-year cap
The IJ
on the number of persons eligible for asylum under IIRIRA § 601(a)." 106
assigned to Zou's case rejected his application, arguing that there was "absolutely no
way that§ 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and supporting case law
apply" because Zou had not married his girlfriend in either a traditional or legal
ceremony. 107 Finally, a third IJ denied Dong's application, holding that the BIA had
refused to extend the reasoning in C-Y-Z- to protect "fiancees or girlfriends or

99. Id. at 188. Moreover, Zou claimed that he and his girlfriend did not have a traditional wedding
banquet because they did not want anyone to know that they were illegally cohabitating. Brief for Petitioner
Zou at 4, Lin, 416 F.3d 184 (No. 03-40837-ag). Lin and his girlfriend attempted to get married but were
denied the right because she had not reached the required age. Brief for Petitioner Lin at 4, Lin, 416 F.3d
184 (No. 02-4611).
100. Lin, 416 F.3d at 188. Upon hearing of his girlfriend's maltreatment, Zou rushed to the hospital
where he was "shoved" by local cadres (communist officials) and chased into the mountains where he hid
for several hours. Brief for Petitioner Zou, supra note 99, at 6.
IOI. Dong and his fiance did not get married because he was not yet of legal age. While they were
engaged, his fiance got pregnant out of plan. Brief for Petitioner Dong at 3, Lin, 416 F.3d 184 (No. 024629).
102. Lin, 416 F.3d at 188.
103. Id. at 189.
I 04. Each of the petitioners raised other issues for determination by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. See Brief for Petitioner Lin, supra note 99, at 2; Brief for Petitioner Dong, supra note 101, at 2;
Brief for Petitioner Zou, supra note 99, at 2. However, these issues are outside of the scope of this Note.
105. Lin, 416 F.3d at 188.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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boyfriends of people who have been forced to undergo an involuntary abortion or
sterilization." 108 Accordingly, the IJs did not permit any of the three asylum petitioners
to establish eligibility for asylum in connection with their fiancees' forced abortions.
The BIA summarily affirmed the IJ's decision in each case. In other words, "a single
Board member affirmed, without opinion, the results of the IJ's decision below,"
pursuant to the BIA's "streamlining regulations." 109
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an IJ's
interpretation of the INA, and specifically section 60l(a) ofIIRIRA, is not entitled to
Chevron deference. 110 In some instances, individual IJ decisions may be entitled to a
lesser form of Skidmore deference. 111 The Second Circuit found that the BIA in C-YZ- failed to "articulate a reasoned basis for making spouses eligible for asylum under
IIRIRA§ 60l(a)" and, therefore, "IJs cannot possibly advance principled-let alone
persuasive-reasons" for distinguishing between spousal eligibility and the eligibility
of boyfriends and fiances. 112 Moreover, because "a fresh look at C-Y-Z- reveals that
the BIA never adequately explained how or why ... it construed IIRIRA § 60l(a)" to
allow spouses of the direct victims of coercive family planning to become eligible for
asylum, even upon a de novo review of section 60l(a) of IIRIRA, it would be
"impossible" to determine whether to affirm or to reverse the BIA's decision. 113
The court clarified that it was not suggesting that there could "be no such basis"
for granting eligibility to the spouses, or even to the boyfriends or fiances, of the direct
victims of persecution; rather, the court was merely highlighting the fact that the BIA,
the sole administrative body possessed of the authority to supply such a reasoned basis,
never did. 114 Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the court stated that it would not

108. Id. at 189.
109. Id.
110. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(holding that where a statute is silent or unclear, courts will defer to an administrative agency's reasonable
interpretation of that statute). The Second Circuit declared that although the Attorney General expressly
delegated rulemaking authority to the BIA, there is no rule or regulation indicating that the Attorney General
either delegated or ever intended to delegate the same authority to Us. Based in part on the fact that
regulations are made through formal procedures involving advance public notice and comment, the Second
Circuit determined that rulings by Us are not customarily afforded Chevron deference. Lin, 416 F.3d at I 90.
It follows that because Us lack the capacity to issue legally binding decisions, they cannot possibly possess
the requisite ability to promulgate a rule on behalf of the Attorney General. Id. Finally, when the BIA
summarily affirms the decision ofan U, the BIA's own regulations hold that the BIA approves only the
result reached in the decision below, not necessarily the reasoning relied upon to reach the decision. Id.
111. See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("[T]he rulings, interpretations
and opinions of[administrative agencies], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority,
do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance.").
112. Lin, 416 F.3d at 191.
113. Id. For example, the BIA never explained the precise statutory language pursuant to which it
deemed spouses eligible for asylum under IIRIRA section 60l(a), nor did the BIA elucidate the reasoning
that motivated its preferred construction. Id. In fact, the Court opined that "frankly'' it appeared that the
BIA's analysis in C-Y-Z-"rested largely on the Immigration and Naturalization Service's concession in that
case." Id.; see also In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997) (professing that the Service
conceded that "the husband of a sterilized wife can essentially stand in her shoes").
114. Lin, 416 F.3d at 191.
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be "conscripted into making policy" for "myriad and obvious reasons .... " 115 Such
an activity, the court explained, is "more properly the province of other bodies,
particularly where, as here, the other body [(the BIA)) is an agency that can bring to
bear particular subject matter expertise."' 16
Notwithstanding arguments advanced by Lin, Dong, Zou, and the United States
Government, the Second Circuit held that it could not "reasonably" ascertain the status
of boyfriend and fiance eligibility under IIRIRA section 60 l(a). 117 It left for the BIA
to determine whether "permissible distinctions can be drawn between spousal eligibility, on the one hand, and boyfriend and fiance eligibility, on the other[,]" or whether
''the rationale for spousal eligibility applies with equal logic and force to the eligibility
ofboyfriends and fiances." 118 Moreover, the court stated that it cannot know whether
to apply spousal eligibility to boyfriends and fiances "[ u]ntil the BIA has clarified why
it established spousal eligibility in the first instance .... " 119 Satisfied with its judicial
rebuff, the Second Circuit retained jurisdiction and remanded the consolidated appeals
to the BIA, demanding that it elucidate the reasoning behind C-Y-Z-.120
VI.

ANALYSIS

A. Divergent Conclusions in Ma v. Ashcroft and Chen v. Ashcroft
Customarily, the United States respects the marriage rules and regulations
enforced in foreign countries, including the implementation of a minimum age

115. Id. at I 92; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947) ("It will not do for a court
to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency's action; nor can a court be expected to chisel
that which must be precise from what the agency has left vague and indecisive.").
116. Lin,416F.3dat
192.
117. Id. The Government argued that the Second Circuit could merely supply its own rationale for the
BIA's determination in C-Y-Z- and then act in accordance with that rationale. Id. However, the Second
Circuit rejected the offer. See id (quoting Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 196-97). Conversely, petitioner Lin
argued that the U and the BIA "misapplied the statutory definition of refugee in failing to recognize that [he]
was eligible for asylum" under IIRIRA section 601(a). Brief for Petitioner Lin, supra note 99, at 14. Lin
averred that he met the definition because he had a well-founded fear that he would be persecuted for his
resistance to China's obtrusive birth control policy and that the Chinese government forced his fiance to
abort their child. Id. at I 5. Citing to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ma, Lin argued that the mere fact that
he was not married to the mother of his aborted child should not be dispositive where, as here, the lack of
a marriage certificate is the result of the implementation of obtrusive family planning policies such as
minimum age requirements. Id. at 16-17. Similarly, petitioner Zou argued that Congress's express purpose
in amending the asylum definition was to grant relief to asylum seekers in Zou's circumstances; the BIA's
interpretation that section 601(a) ofIIRIRA was inapplicable in his case was patently unreasonable. Brief
for Petitioner Zou, supra note 99, at 17. Where, as here, "Chinese birth control policy was the sole reason
that [Zou] and his wife were unable to officially marry[,] ... the act of cohabitating and conceiving the child
itself constituted an act of'resistance' to birth control policy." Id. at 21. Moreover, Zou argued that "[t]he
Supreme Court has held that, in the absence of a marital relationship, a biological father's relationship with
his child is protected under the Constitution." Id. at 24 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248 (1983)). Petitioner Dong's argument was congruous with that of petitioner Lin. See Brief for
Petitioner Dong, supra note IOI, at 18-21.
118. Lin, 416 F.3d at 192.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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requirement. Perhaps an argument can be advanced for greater respect of China's
marriage laws because, as the Chinese Constitution establishes, 121 it is an effective way
for China to attempt to curtail overpopulation and promote a stable economy and
society: however inhumane, the ends justify the means. Arguably, the United States
has an interest in deferring to and respecting the marriage laws enforced by other
countries in the expectation that the same deference and respect will be afforded to its
own marriage laws. Finally, there are political and international policy considerations
at stake; the United States' imposition of its own cultural norms in the intimate realm
of China's conceptualization of marriage and family laws may be regarded as offensive
and imperialistic. Thus, individual rights are sacrificed to the "greater good" of
international stability. Perhaps the BIA and the Third Circuit had these sweeping
principles in mind.
However, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in Ma v. Ashcroft, a careful review of
the development of China's coercive family planning policy reveals the ban on
''underage" marriage to be an essential part of China's obtrusive population control
program. 122 Thus, to deny asylum eligibility to a man who would be legally married
to his persecuted partner, but for an inhumane law, is an absurd conclusion. Absurdity
aside, the denial of asylum under such a circumstance subverts Congress's intent in
amending the immigration laws so as to provide protection to people who suffer under
the atrocious population control practices of the Chinese government. BIA decisions,
to the contrary, function in direct opposition to the implicit purposes of the enactment
of section 60l(a) of IIRIRA and, as the Ninth Circuit concluded, are not worthy of
judicial respect even under the most deferential standards.
In addition to undermining congressional intent, the BIA's recent interpretation
of section 60l(a) ofIIRIRA results in harsh and arbitrary consequences, specifically
the breaking apart ofa family. For example, ifLin's wife applied for asylum based on
her forced abortion procedure, she would automatically be eligible under the amended
definition of refugee. However, under the BIA's rule, adopted by the Third Circuit,
Lin would not be eligible (nor Zou, nor Dong) because his girlfriend was "underage"
and, therefore, unlawful and incapable of legal registration under the Chinese
population control program. Conceivably, this rule presents the couple with a
Robson's choice: either break up the family or avoid such a harsh result by remaining
in China to face continued persecution and human rights violations. Regrettably, a
bulk of the responsibility for such an outrageous consequence falls squarely on the
shoulders of the United States government as a result of the BIA's unjustifiable
interpretation and Congress's acquiescence.
Perhaps from the perspective of judicial economy-situating the goal of efficient
adjudication before that of the protection of human rights (the ends justify the
means}-the BIA's rule, and Judge Alito's decision in Chen v. Ashcroft, is reasonable
judicial policy. After all, as Judge Alito points out, requiring proof of a marriage
certificate is a clean-cut, easily enforceable standard that benefits the legal process by
circumventing difficult and problematic factual inquiries. Moreover, it deters
applicants from attempting to falsify intimate relationships in order to gain access to

I 21. See supra notes I 6- I 8 and accompanying text.
122. Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553,559 (9th Cir. 2004); see also discussion supra Part II.A.
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the United States. Thus, the argument proceeds, undesirable results in some cases, as
atrocious as they may be, are the price to be paid for the efficient function of the
immigration laws; the ends justify the means.
Putting aside the fact that the BIA's bright-line rule sabotages congressional
intent, Judge Alito never explains why immigration policy in this circumstance should
tum on the legitimacy of a marriage law that is itself a part of a population control
regime that the United States government has repeatedly decried as coercive and
atrocious. Rather, Judge Alito declared the outcome of the marriage law to be "inconsequential." With all due respect to Justice Alito, it is absurd to declare a law that
violates an individual's human rights-and at the same time results in that individual's
ineligibility for asylum and protection of his violated rights-"inconsequential."
In
effect, Judge Alito's pronouncement, although arguably merely dicta, allows an
inhumane policy to work an additional, and perhaps more appalling, hardship on the
applicant.
Absent a bright-line standard, scrutinizing asylum applications filed pursuant to
section 60l(a) of IIRIRA will consume additional time and judicial resources.
However, if such a use of resources results in the protection of individuals who are
exposed to unimaginable violations of their personal rights, it is a valid and reasonable
use of those resources. Moreover, in the area of immigration law, difficult and
protracted factual inquiries come with the territory. Denying access to such resources
in such a grave situation and in an area in which the United States has expressed clear
opposition is unreasonable and absurd. This denial transforms the United States into
a Janus-faced hypocrite: the justice system underhandedly supports a policy, while the
government (perhaps disingenuously) vehemently opposes it.
It is worth noting that, in his opinion for the Third Circuit, Judge Alito expressed
reservation as to why "every spouse of a person who undergoes a forced abortion or
sterilization should be deemed to have 'resisted' the 'coercive population control
program[,]"' asking: "what if the spouse who did not personally undergo the procedure
sided with the government and favored the abortion or sterilization?" 123 Although the
question is fair and reasonable, the answer is simple: the Attorney General, the IJs, the
BIA and the Courts of Appeals are not only capable, but also are relied upon to
adequately dispose of asylum applications based on fraudulent pretenses. Judge
Alito's argument proves too much. If government officials and judges can scrutinize
whether spouses have in fact been persecuted, what makes them unable to engage in
the same analysis concerning non-spouses? Are government officials and the courts
so afraid of opening the door to a greater number of asylum applications that they
would be willing to prevent men and women who have suffered human rights
violations from obtaining asylum?
The Third Circuit's final rationale for not protecting the unmarried partners of
individuals who suffer an abortion and/or sterilization procedure was extinguished by
a subsequent act of Congress. Judge Alito looked to the 1,000 person-per-fiscal-year
cap on the number of refugees permitted access to asylum under section 60l(a) of
IIRIRA as an indication of Congress's intent that the statute be interpreted narrowly
so as to preclude asylum eligibility to unmarried partners. However, this limitation

123. Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221,226 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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was repealed pursuant to the REAL ID Act of2005. 124 Therefore, what Judge Alito
saw as an implicit expression of congressional intent to restrict protection now reads
as an express indication that asylum protection should be expanded. Accordingly, as
the Second Circuit noted in Lin, ''a construction of IIRIRA § 60l(a) can no longer
rely-in whole or in part-on the existence ofan annual cap." 125
Analyzing the radically different decisions handed down by the Third and the
Ninth Circuits while interpreting the same statute and relying on the same BIA
precedent decision, it is clear that the BIA in C-Y-Z- did not adequately explain the
rationale behind its reading of section 60l{a) ofIIRIRA Thus, given that the BIA is
the body solely responsible and most adequately situated to interpret and apply the
immigration laws, it is equally clear that the Second Circuit was correct to remand Lin
so that the BIA might clarify its rationale. Debatably, until the BIA complies with the
Second Circuit's demands, the Circuit Courts will remain split; the conservative
circuits will favor a narrow interpretation of section 60l{a), whereas liberal circuits
will interpret the statute broadly in order to protect unmarried partners.
B. How the BIA Should Decide Lin v. United States Department of Justice on
Remand from the Second Circuit

First, and most specifically, the BIA should grant asylum to all three petitioners:
Lin, Dong, and Zou. Although section 60 l (a) of IIRIRA provides ample reason to
expand asylum protection to the unmarried partner of an individual persecuted under
China's coercive population control policies, asylum should be granted to Lin, Dong,
and Zou because "in a well-documented and credible case, plausible in light of country
conditions, the applicant[s] [have] articulated [their partners'] and [their] opposition
to a compulsory government policy that fails to respect fundamental human rights, and
the punishment they individually and jointly suffered because of that opposition." 126
Independent of their marital status, Lin, Dong, and Zou were victims of persecution.
Upon their return to China, each man reasonably faces, among other penalties,
sterilization, fines, loss of employment, and the reoccurrence of the atrocities they
were already forced to endure, namely the forced abortion of their children. Why
should refugee status ever turn on the marital status of the individual applicant? 127
Second, and more generally, the BIA should elucidate the proper reason for
granting asylum to the Chinese applicant in C-Y-Z-. Standing alone, circumstances
such as those faced by the applicants in Lin are sufficient to guarantee their protection
under the asylum laws of the United States. The amended definition of refugee
supplied by section 601 (a) of IIRIRA merely specifies that certain individuals who
have been forced to undergo invasive medical procedures as a result of China's
population control policies, or who have suffered because of their opposition to
undergoing such procedures, or have a well-founded fear of being subjected to such

124. See supra notes 63-64, and accompanying text.
125. Lin v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 416 F.3d 184, 188 n.l (2d Cir. 2005).
126. In re C-Y-Z-, 211. & N. Dec. 915,921 (BJ.A. 1997) (Rosenburg, Board Member, concurring).
127. Notably, where the marital status of the individual is dispositive of her ability to qualify for refugee
status, other individuals who are not permitted to marry (i.e., gays, lesbians, and transgendered individuals)
will be ineligible even though their partners suffer the same type of persecution.
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128
The amended definition,
persecution, are eligible for asylum under the definition.
therefore, should not be interpreted as a limiting provision, precluding an applicant's
ability to establish his refugee eligibility based on the pre-amendment definition of
refugee. Rather, the amendment should be interpreted as a clear congressional
mandate that these individuals qualify as ·refugees.
As Board Member Rosenburg so aptly recognized in her concurrence in C-Y-Z-,
"[t]he right to privacy, the right to have a family, the right to bodily integrity, and the
right to unfettered reproductive choice are fundamental individual rights, recognized
domestically and internationally." 129 The belief that these are inalienable rights, along
with the choice to exercise them and the conviction that such a decision must be
revered, not trampled, constitutes a "political opinion" regardless of whether such a
choice is in direct opposition to governmental policies. Because the individual's
choice to remain fertile and procreate in violation of government policy is a political
opinion, the forced infliction of abortion and/or sterilization (not to mention other
coercive tactics that are implemented) is persecution on the basis of political opinion,
which is protected by the statute both before and after the amendment.
Regardless of whether an individual is capable ofarticulating and conceptualizing
his or her opinion and rights in a sophisticated manner, he or she holds a political
opinion in the eyes of the law ifhe or she opposes or resists a coercive governmental
policy on personal, ethical, religious, or philosophical grounds. In broadly defining
refugee and political opinion to embrace those persecuted on the basis of political
opinion, and in enacting section 601 (a) of IIRIRA,it was Congress's intentto provide
for the protection of individuals who are persecuted on the basis of political opinion;
it is the function of the courts to adhere to congressional intent.

VII. CONCLUSION
If and when the BIA reconsiders Lin, Dong, and Zou's asylum applications, it
Additionally, it should extend the
should grant asylum to all three applicants.
protection of refugee status and asylum to the unmarried partners of individuals who
were forced to undergo sterilization and/or abortion procedures as a result of China's
coercive family planning practices. To hold otherwise, whether for the sake of
international policy, procedural efficiency, or to avoid intractable factual inquiries,
inextricably binds the United States to China as a partner in the continued violation of
the human rights of thousands of Chinese citizens.

128. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
129. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 921 (Rosenburg, Board Member, concurring).
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